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Changing one’s mind on the basis of new evidence is a hallmark of cognitive 
flexibility. To revise our confidence in a previous decision, new evidence should be 
used to update beliefs about choice accuracy, but how this process unfolds in the 
human brain remains unknown. Here we manipulated whether additional sensory 
evidence supports or negates a previous motion direction discrimination judgment 
while recording markers of neural activity in the human brain using fMRI. A 
signature of post-decision evidence (change in log-odds correct) was selectively 
observed in the activity of posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC). In contrast, distinct 
activity profiles in anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC) mediated the impact of post-
decision evidence on subjective confidence, independently of changes in decision 
value. Together our findings reveal candidate neural mediators of post-decisional 
changes of mind in the human brain, and indicate possible targets for ameliorating 





John-Maynard Keynes allegedly said, “When the facts change, I change my mind”. 
Updating beliefs on the receipt of new evidence is a hallmark of cognitive flexibility. 
Previous work has focused on how newly arriving evidence for each choice option is 
evaluated to guide ongoing motor actions in the coordinate frame of a perceptual 
discrimination decision (e.g. left vs. right)1-4. However, revising one’s confidence 
about an already-made choice imposes a different coordinate frame on the evidence, 
and requires weighting the evidence comparatively with respect to the choice5-7. Here, 
we leveraged a novel extension of a classic motion discrimination task to investigate 
the computational signatures of such assessment and to investigate how new evidence 
leads to changes in decision confidence (Figure 1), while recording markers of neural 
activity in the human brain using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We 
confirmed behaviorally that post-decision motion led to systematic changes in 
confidence about the accuracy of a previous decision. This design allowed us to study 
the underpinnings of changes of mind by analyzing how new evidence impacts 
confidence bidirectionally, in a graded fashion, rather than only on a subset of trials 
on which discrete choice reversals are observed.  
 
We hypothesized that brain regions in the human frontal lobe implicated in 
performance monitoring (posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC), encompassing 
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex8,9 and pre-supplementary motor area10) and 
metacognition (anterior prefrontal cortex; aPFC11-14) would play a central role in 
updating beliefs about previous choice accuracy. Tracking evidence in the coordinate 
frame of choice accuracy rests on computing a probability that a previous choice was 
(in)correct given the new evidence available, or a change in log-odds correct5. When 
this quantity (which we refer to as “post-decision evidence” or PDE) is sufficiently 
low the alternative option becomes more favourable3. A Bayesian observer predicts a 
qualitative signature of PDE in both behaviour and neural activity. Specifically, we 
expect a positive relationship between PDE and motion strength on correct trials 
(because new evidence serves to a confirm a previous choice) and a negative 
relationship on error trials (because new evidence disconfirms a previous choice; 
Figure 1C, middle panel).  
 
A further step in the computational chain is to use PDE to update one’s final 
(subjective) confidence in a choice (Figure 1C, righthand panel). For an ideal 
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observer, there is a systematic and direct relationship between PDE and subsequent 
changes in confidence. However it is known that subjective confidence estimates do 
not always track objective changes in performance15,16, and previous studies suggest 
the prefrontal cortex as a key determinant of such metacognitive fidelity11,13. 
Moreover, a key challenge when interpreting confidence-related neural activity is 
dissociating distinct variables that may be correlated due to a particular task 
manipulation17. For instance, changes in confidence are often correlated with both 
evidence strength and the expected value of a choice (although see 18,19). Here we 
carefully separated these quantities through use of an incentive scheme in which 
subjects were rewarded for being highly confident and right, and unconfident and 
wrong, ensuring changes in final confidence were decoupled from subjective value 
(Figure 1C, righthand panel). We additionally used mediation analyses to formally 
identify brain activity capturing the impact of model PDE on subjective confidence 
reports, which were obtained at the end of every trial20. This approach has proven 
fruitful in studying the neural basis of other subjective states such as pain while 
controlling for lower-level effects of sensory stimulation21, but has not previously 
been applied in studies of decision-making. Together our findings reveal a division of 
labour in which pMFC activity tracks post-decision evidence, whereas lateral aPFC 
additionally mediates the impact of post-decision evidence on confidence, 




Participants carried out the perceptual decision task outlined in Figure 1A, first in a 
behavioural session (N=25 subjects), and subsequently while undergoing fMRI (N=22 
subjects). The subject’s goal was to make accurate decisions about the direction of 
random dot motion, and then to estimate confidence in their initial choice. A new 
sample of dot motion in the same (correct) direction was displayed after the subject’s 
choice but before their confidence rating. Subjects were rewarded for the accuracy of 
their confidence judgments, and thus the value of a trial increased both when they 
became more accurate about being right and more accurate about being wrong (see 
Figure 1C and Methods). A fully factorial design crossed 3 pre-decision coherence 
levels with 3 post-decision coherence levels yielding 9 experimental conditions. 
Together these features of the task design allowed us to dissociate motion strength 
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and decision value from changes of mind, as shown in Figure 1C. To equate evidence 
strength across individuals, before the main task each participant performed a 
calibration procedure to identify a set of motion coherences that led to approximately 
60%, 75% and 90% accuracy (Supplementary Figure 1). Examination of the empirical 
cross-correlation between task features and behaviour (motion strength, confidence, 
value and response times) confirmed a limited correlation between predictors 
(maximum absolute mean r = 0.38 for fMRI session; Supplementary Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. Post-decision evidence task and computational framework. A) Task 
design. Participants made an initial left/right motion discrimination judgment, after 
which they saw additional post-decision motion of variable coherence moving in the 
same direction as pre-decision motion. They were asked to rate their confidence in 
their initial choice on a scale from 0% (certainly wrong) – 100% (certainly correct). 
Confidence scale steps were additionally labeled with the words “certainly wrong”, 
“probably wrong”, “maybe wrong”, “maybe correct”, “probably correct”, 
“certainly correct” (not shown). B) Bayesian graphical model indicating how pre- 
and post-decision motion samples are combined with the chosen action to update an 
estimate of decision confidence. C) Simulated decision variables from the model in 
(B) showing a distinction between updating evidence in the coordinate frame of 
motion direction (left panel) and choice accuracy (middle panel) as a function of 
post-decision motion strength and choice. A change in log-odds correct (“post-
decision evidence”; PDE) is revealed by a qualitative interaction between post-
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time



























































































decision motion strength and choice accuracy (middle panel). The right panel 
indicates the expected mapping between log-odds correct and both final 
confidence/decision value. Confidence and value are dissociated on change-of-mind 
trials (confidence < 0.5) through use of a quadratic scoring rule, which rewards 
subjects for both being confident and right, and unconfident and wrong. 
 
Choice, confidence and changes of mind 
 
As expected, stronger pre-decision motion led to increases in response accuracy 
(behavioural session: hierarchical logistic regression, β = 9.21 (standard error: 0.74), z 
= 12.4, P < 2 × 10-16; fMRI session: β = 7.00 (0.70), z = 10.0, P < 2.0 × 10-16; Figure 
2A, C and Supplementary Table 1). We observed robust changes of confidence in 
response to post-decision motion (Figure 2B, D). Specifically, we found that after an 
erroneous decision, stronger post-decision motion led to progressively lower 
confidence (behavioural session: hierarchical linear regression, β = -1.15 (0.14), 𝜒#(1) 
= 71.8, P < 2.2 × 10-16; fMRI session: β = -1.05 (0.11), 𝜒#(1) = 88.0, P < 2.2 × 10-16; 
Supplementary Table 2) whereas after a correct decision, confidence was increased 
due to the confirmatory influence of new evidence (behavioural session: β = 0.41 
(0.08), 𝜒#(1) = 26.3, P = 3.0 × 10-7; fMRI session: β = 0.54 (0.08), 𝜒#(1) = 44.7, P = 
2.3 × 10-11). Binary changes of mind are revealed by confidence levels lower than 0.5 
(i.e., greater confidence in the alternative response) with strong post-decision motion 
accordingly leading to more frequent binary changes of mind (behavioural session, 
mean = 11.7 % of trials; fMRI session, mean = 18.4 % of trials) than weak post-
decision motion (behavioural session, mean = 10.4 % of trials; fMRI session, mean = 
14.8 % of trials). Subjects were well calibrated, with final confidence approximately 





Figure 2. Behavioural results. Upper panels show data collected in an initial 
behavioural session (900 trials per subject, N=25); lower panels show behavioural 
data collected during the fMRI session (360 trials per subject, N=22). In each panel 
data are separated by pre- and post-decision motion coherence (L=low; M=medium; 
H=high). A, C) Performance (% correct). B, D) Aggregate confidence ratings 
separated according to whether the decision was correct (green) or incorrect (red). 
Lines show data simulated from the best-fitting Bayesian+RT model parameters. Data 
are plotted as boxplots for each condition, with data points outside of 1.5 × the 
interquartile range shown separately as circles. For model simulations, error bars 
reflect 95% confidence intervals for the mean. See also Supplementary Figure 5. 
 
Computational model of post-decisional change in confidence 
 
We compared between a set of alternative computational models of how confidence is 
affected by post-decision motion strength (see Methods for details). All models 
generalize signal detection theory, with a single free parameter k mapping pre- and 
post-decision motion strength (coherence) onto an internal decision variable (Figure 
1B). Extensions to an ideal observer model explored the impact of asymmetric 
weighting parameters on pre- and post-decision motion6,7, asymmetric weighting of 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence6, flexible mappings between probability 
correct and reported confidence22, and the influence of initial response time23 (see 
Behavioural session
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Methods and Supplementary Figure 4). We assessed model fit by examining 
generalization across testing sessions to avoid overfitting; the best-fitting 
Bayesian+RT model was able to capture both the relationship between pre-decision 
motion strength and choice accuracy, and the impact of post-decision motion on 
changes in confidence (Figure 2 and Supplementary Figure 5) (difference in median 
log-likelihood relative to next best model: behavioural->fMRI, 1932; fMRI-
>behavioural, 1298; Supplementary Figure 4). The 𝛽%& parameter of this model was 
negative in both cases (behavioural session: 𝛽%& = -0.73 (0.26); fMRI session: 𝛽%& = -
0.37 (0.22); Supplementary Table 3) indicating that faster initial decisions boosted 
final confidence. We note that a qualitative signature of PDE in Figure 1C is common 
to all model variants, and makes clear predictions for interrogation of brain imaging 
data, which we turn to next. 
 
Neural representations of post-decision evidence 
 
We sought to identify fMRI activity patterns consistent with tracking PDE in the 
coordinate frame of choice accuracy (changes in log-odds correct due to post-decision 
motion).  Such patterns are characterized by a change in the sign of the relationship 
between post-decision motion strength and brain activity on correct vs. error trials 
(Figure 1C, middle panel). This change in sign is qualitative and we remain agnostic 
about its direction at the level of the fMRI signal – it is plausible that a particular 
neural population encodes increasing rather than decreasing likelihood of change of 
mind, in which case we would observe a positive relationship on error trials and a 
negative relationship on correct trials.  
 
We first computed interaction contrasts (positive or negative) between post-decision 
motion strength and choice accuracy, to identify patterns of activity that mirror a 
signature of PDE. Interaction effects were observed whole-brain corrected at both the 
voxel- and cluster-level in pMFC (Figure 3A; peak: [6 18 50], PvoxelFWE = 0.002; 
PclusterFWE < 0.001) and at the cluster-level in right insula (peak: [44 14 -6], PclusterFWE 
= 0.009; Supplementary Table 4). Accordingly, in an independently defined pMFC 
ROI, we obtained a significant interaction between post-decision motion strength and 
initial decision accuracy in single-trial activity estimates aligned to the onset of post-
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decision motion (Figure 3B and Supplementary Table 5; β = -0.11 (0.037), 𝜒#(1) = 
9.35, P = 0.0022). This interaction effect was driven by an increase on error trials, and 
decrease on correct trials (Figure 3B). 
 
Finally, to corroborate our model-free analysis, we extracted the predicted PDE 
(𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.*/- ) on each trial from the Bayesian+RT model fitted to each subject’s in-
scanner behavioural data. As expected from the model-free pattern, a negative linear 
relationship was observed between model PDE and pMFC activity (Figure 3C; β = -
0.052 (0.0085), 𝜒#(1) = 37.4, P = 9.54 × 10-10). No relationship was observed 
between pre-decision evidence (𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.+, ) and pMFC activity (β = -0.013 (0.013), 𝜒#(1) = 1.06, P = 0.30), indicating specific engagement during post-decisional 
changes of confidence. To establish the anatomical specificity of the effect of PDE on 
brain activity we interrogated prefrontal and striatal ROIs also implicated in decision 
confidence and metacognition (ventral striatum, vmPFC and bilateral aPFC areas 46, 
FPl and FPm from the atlas of Neubert et al.24; Supplementary Figures 6, 7 and 
Supplementary Table 5). None of these ROIs showed an interaction between post-
decision motion strength and choice (P > 0.05) and contrasts of regression 
coefficients revealed greater interaction effects in pMFC compared to aPFC 
subregions (area 46: 𝜒#(1) = 3.7, P = 0.054; FPl: 𝜒#(1) = 5.0, P = 0.026; FPm: 𝜒#(1) 
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Figure 3. Neural signatures of post-decision evidence. A) Whole-brain statistical 
parametric map for the interaction contrast error/correct × post-decision motion 
strength, thresholded at P < 0.05 FWE corrected, cluster-defining threshold P < 
0.001 (coronal section, y=18; saggital section, x=6). Activation in pMFC was 
significant corrected for multiple comparisons at both the voxel- and cluster-level 
(peak MNI coordinate: [6 18 50]). B) fMRI signal extracted from an independent 
pMFC ROI and sorted according to the subject’s choice accuracy (red = error, green 
= correct) and post-decision motion strength. The left panel shows activity 
timecourses aligned to the onset of pre-decision motion (trial start); the right panel 
shows condition-specific activity estimated from regressors aligned to the onset of 
post-decision motion. A significant interaction between choice accuracy and post-
decision motion strength was obtained in pMFC; **, hierarchical regression P < 
0.01, two-tailed. C) Average BOLD signal in the pMFC ROI as a function of post-
decision evidence extracted from the Bayesian model fit (change in log-odds correct). 
For visualization, post-decision evidence is aggregated into 4 equally spaced bins per 
subject. In panels B and C, error bars reflect standard errors of the mean; solid lines 
show the mean of subject-level linear fits. N=22. 
 
Neural mediators of final confidence 
 
Having identified a putative neural signature of PDE in pMFC, we next searched for 
brain areas tracking subjects’ final confidence in a decision. One computationally 
plausible hypothesis is that such updates of final confidence are mediated by 
anatomically distinct networks involved in metacognition25,26. Anterior prefrontal 
cortex (aPFC) is a leading candidate as this region is implicated in metacognitive 
assessment of both perceptual and economic decisions12,14,18. In a whole-brain 
analysis we found widespread activity showing both positive and negative 
relationships with final confidence (Figure 4A; Supplementary Table 6) in regions 
including pMFC (negative relationship), medial aPFC (positive relationship) and 




Figure 4. Neural signatures of final confidence in choice. A) Whole-brain analysis 
of activity related to final confidence reports on each trial. Cool colours indicate 
negative relationships; hot colours indicate positive relationships. Thresholded at P < 
0.05, FWE corrected, cluster-defining threshold P < 0.001. N=22. B) Hierarchical 
regression coefficients relating confidence to single-trial activity estimates on both 
change and no-change of mind trials. Orange arrows indicate that the pattern of 
coefficients is consistent in sign, as predicted for regions tracking the full range of 
final confidence in an initial choice. Yellow arrows indicate a flip in sign, as 
predicted for regions tracking changes in decision value. Error bars indicate 
standard errors. ** P < 0.01, * P < 0.05, two-tailed. C) Multiple regressions of 
confidence and value on activity timecourse in ROIs. Points below timecourse 
indicate significant excursions of T-statistics assessed using permutation tests.  Error 
bars indicate standard errors of the coefficient mean; N=22. 
 
We further sought to establish whether aPFC activation continues to track confidence 
shifts on trials in which discrete changes of mind were recorded (confidence levels < 
0.5). Activity that tracks such changes of mind should show a consistent 
positive/negative slope across both change and no-change trials; in contrast, activity 
tracking decision value should reverse its relationship with confidence on change 
trials (due to the increasing reward available for betting against one’s choice; Figure 







































































































































aPFC ROIs were significantly negative on both change and no-change trials (Figure 
4B and Supplementary Table 7; area 46: change trials β = -0.36 (0.15), 𝜒#(1) = 5.9, P 
= 0.015; no-change trials β = -0.25 (0.-54), 𝜒#(1) = 20.6, P = 5.6 × 10-6; FPl: change 
trials β = -0.41 (0.17), 𝜒#(1) = 6.1, P = 0.013; no-change trials β = -0.12 (0.06), 𝜒#(1) 
= 4.1, P = 0.044). In contrast, regression coefficients in FPm flipped in sign on 
change vs. no-change trials (Figure 4B). Accordingly, when regressing regional 
timeseries against both confidence and value in the same GLM, we found that 
confidence but not value covaried with a late signal in area 46 and FPl (Figure 4C). 
Conversely, and consistent with previous reports18,19, FPm (and also pMFC, vmPFC 
and ventral striatal ROIs; see Supplementary Figure 7) showed simultaneous 
correlates of both confidence and value. These results support a conclusion that lateral 
aPFC subregions are specifically engaged when subjects change their minds about a 
previous decision on the basis of new evidence. 
 
A key question is how PDE (encoded in pMFC) leads to subsequent shifts in final 
confidence in a previous decision. To test this hypothesis, we used multi-level 
mediation analysis21,28 to jointly test for effects of PDE (from subject-specific fits of 
the Bayesian+RT computational model) on brain activity (path a), brain activity on 
final confidence (path b) and mediation (𝑎	 × 	𝑏) effects (Figure 5), while controlling 
for both response times and pre-decision evidence. A mediator can be interpreted as 
an indirect pathway through a brain area that links PDE with changes in subjective 
confidence, suggesting that if such a region were disrupted, this relationship would 
also be disrupted or abolished. We examined mediation both in anatomically defined 
aPFC subregions and at the voxel level across the whole brain. 
 
In line with our hypothesis, activity in area 46 and FPl was found to mediate the 
impact of PDE on final confidence (Figure 5A and Supplementary Table 8; 𝑎	 × 	𝑏 
effect, bootstrapped P-values: area 46, P = 0.0027; FPl, P = 0.0056). While mediation 
modeling is correlational, precluding a direct inference on directionality, we note that 
control models in which PDE and confidence were reversed did not result in a 
significant mediation effect in either area 46 (P = 0.54) or FPl (P = 0.46). Mediation 
may be driven either by consistent effects of paths a and b across the group, or by 
covariance between stimulus- and report-related responses21. In area 46 there was 
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evidence for consistent main effects of path a and b in the group as a whole. In 
contrast, in FPl, mediation was driven by the covariance of a and b paths across 
subjects. Finally, in a voxel-based mediation analysis we observed a significant 
cluster in left lateral aPFC (Figure 5B), corroborating our ROI analysis. 
 
In an exploratory whole-brain analysis we also observed clusters in pMFC and 
bilateral parietal cortex that, together with aPFC, met whole-brain corrected statistical 
criteria for mediation (Supplementary Figure 8). This result is consistent with pMFC 
activity both tracking PDE (Figure 3C) and covarying with final confidence (Figure 
4A). Taken together, our findings indicate complementary roles for frontal subregions 
in changes of mind: pMFC (but not aPFC) activity tracks PDE, whereas lateral aPFC 




Figure 5. Neural mediation of PDE on final confidence. A) Multi-level mediation 
analysis assessing whether the effect of PDE on final confidence is mediated by 
activity in anatomically defined aPFC ROIs. For each ROI, the upper row of models 
indicates forward mediation; the lower row indicates reverse mediation (of 
confidence onto PDE). Mediation was observed only for forward models in areas 46 
and FPl (red arrows). B) The model used in (A) was fit to each voxel independently to 
create a map of P-values for the mediation (a x b) effect in aPFC. Thresholded at P < 
0.05 FWE corrected at the cluster level using Monte Carlo simulation, cluster-































Changing one’s mind on the basis of new evidence is a hallmark of cognitive 
flexibility. Such reversals are supported computationally by sensitivity to post-
decision evidence – if I have made an error, and the new evidence is compelling, I 
should change my mind. Here we leveraged a novel manipulation of post-decisional 
information in perceptual decision-making to study this process. Participants 
appropriately increased their confidence when new evidence was supportive of an 
initial decision, and decreased their confidence when it was contradictory. A signature 
of post-decision evidence encoding – a change in log-odds correct – was identified in 
the activity of posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC). We further observed that 
distinct activity profiles in lateral aPFC mediated the impact of post-decision evidence 
on subjective confidence. 
 
Previous work has focused on how stimulus evidence may reverse the accumulation 
of evidence in circuits coding for one or the other choice option (e.g. left or right). To 
update one’s confidence in a previous choice, new evidence in the coordinate frame of 
stimulus/response may be further transformed into the coordinate frame of choice 
accuracy5. These schemes are not mutually exclusive – to update an ongoing action 
plan, it may be sufficient to continue accumulating evidence in a “pipeline” directly 
guiding the movement towards one or other target2,3, while in parallel revising one’s 
belief in the accuracy of a previous choice25,26. In an elegant behavioural study, van 
den Berg and colleagues demonstrated that a single stream of evidence may continue 
to accumulate during action initiation, and via a comparison to thresholds specified in 
stimulus/response space (i.e. log-odds rightward), be used to guide changes of both 
decision and (response-specific) confidence3. Here, by introducing a novel 
manipulation of post-decisional information, we reveal a circumscribed activity 
pattern in pMFC consistent with tracking PDE in the frame of choice accuracy. 
Examining mutual interactions between evidence coded in the frame of 
stimulus/response identity or choice accuracy is beyond the design of the current 
study, but may be profitably investigated by tracking each of these coordinate frames 
using techniques with high temporal resolution such as magnetoencephalography. 
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Even in the absence of a direct manipulation of post-decision evidence, signal 
detection models of decision confidence predict an interaction between stimulus 
strength and choice accuracy16,29. We also observed such a pattern in our behavioural 
data – confidence decreased on error trials, and increased on correct trials, when pre-
decision motion was stronger (Supplementary Table 2; this effect was tempered by 
the influence of response times on error-trial confidence, as shown by the fits of the 
Bayesian+RT model in Figure 2). However we note that the interaction effect in 
pMFC was primarily driven by post- not pre-decision evidence (Supplementary Table 
5) indicating a distinct role in post-decisional changes of mind. An interaction 
between stimulus strength and choice accuracy has also been observed in the activity 
of rodent orbitofrontal cortex in the absence of a post-decision evidence 
manipulation29, and inactivation of this region impairs confidence-guided 
behaviours30. Searching for signatures of PDE in other species may therefore shed 
light on mechanisms supporting changes of mind that are conserved (e.g. in 
homologies of pMFC31), and those that may be unique to humans (e.g. those 
supported by granular aPFC). 
 
The function of pMFC in human cognition has been the subject of extended scrutiny 
and debate. A well-established finding is that a paracingulate region activates to error 
commission, consistent with its role as a cortical generator of the error-related 
negativity8-10. More recently, studies have linked dorsal anterior cingulate activity to a 
broader role in behavioural switching away from a default option32. Our findings 
complement these lines of work by characterizing a computation related to changes of 
mind.  Specifically, our analysis indicates that pMFC activity tracks whether an initial 
choice should be revised in light of newly acquired information. The peak activation 
in this contrast was obtained in pre-SMA, dorsal to the rostral cingulate zone33. While 
previous studies of error detection have focused on all-or-nothing, endogenous error 
responses in pMFC, our findings suggest a more computationally sophisticated 
picture: pMFC activity tracked graded changes in log-odds correct34,35 (Figure 3C). 
Together our results indicate that error monitoring, confidence and changes of mind 
may represent different behavioural manifestations of a common computation 
supported by inputs to pMFC25,36,37.  
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Beyond pMFC, we found a widespread network of regions where activity tracks final 
confidence including negative correlations in lateral PFC, parietal cortex and pMFC, 
and positive correlations in vmPFC and precuneus, consistent with previous 
findings12,14,18,19,27. Building on an analogous body of work on the neural substrates of 
subjective pain21,38, we leveraged mediation analysis to formally unpack an inter-
relationship between post-decision evidence, brain activity and the final confidence 
subjects held in their decision. Lateral aPFC (areas 46 and FPl) activity mediated the 
impact of post-decision evidence on subjective confidence. Lateral aPFC has 
previously been implicated in self-evaluation of decision performance12,14,18, and 
receives a significant anatomical projection from pMFC39. It is notable that in the 
current study, the activity profile of lateral aPFC covaried with final confidence in 
both mediation and regression analyses, but did not track post-decision evidence or 
decision value per se. It is therefore plausible that lateral aPFC supports a 
representation of choice quality that contributes to metacognitive control of future 
behavior40-42. Together with aPFC, exploratory whole-brain analyses also indicated 
posterior parietal cortex as a mediator of the impact of PDE on confidence, consistent 
with a role for a broader frontoparietal network in metacognition and confidence 
formation43,44. 
 
In previous research it has proven difficult to isolate changes in decision confidence 
from other confounding variables. The probability of a previous decision remaining 
correct is often correlated with expected value. In other words, if subjects are 
motivated to be accurate, decision confidence usually scales with decision value. Here 
we separated expected value from confidence by allowing subjects to gain reward by 
betting against their original decision using the quadratic scoring rule. This rule 
returns maximum reward both when a correct trial is rated with high confidence and 
an incorrect trial is rated with low confidence (Figure 1C). In medial PFC we found a 
U-shaped pattern of activity in relation to reported confidence, consistent with 
previous findings that both confidence and value are multiplexed on the medial 
surface18,19. In contrast, lateral aPFC activity covaried with final confidence reports 
but not value, indicating a specific role in changes of mind. 
 
In conclusion, by integrating computational modeling with human fMRI, we reveal a 
neural signature of how new evidence is integrated to support graded changes of 
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mind. Multiple coordinate frames are in play when new evidence leads to shifts in 
beliefs – from coding evidence in support of one or other decision option, to updating 
the accuracy of a choice, to communicating changes in confidence. Neuroimaging 
revealed complementary roles for frontal subregions in changes of mind: post-
decision evidence was tracked by pMFC, while aPFC additionally mediated final 
confidence in choice. Failure of such updating processes may lead to impairments to 
cognitive flexibility and/or an inability to discard previously held beliefs45,46. 
Together our findings shed light on the building blocks of changes of mind in the 
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Twenty-five participants gave written informed consent to take part in a study 
conducted across two separate days. No statistical tests were used to pre-determine 
the sample size which is similar to those reported in previous publications14,32,40. A 
behavioural experiment was administered on the first day and an fMRI experiment on 
the second day. Twenty-five participants were included in the analysis of behavioural 
data (14 females, mean age 24.0, SD = 3.6). In the fMRI experiment, one participant 
was excluded due to excess head motion and one participant was excluded due to lack 
of variability in confidence ratings (308/360 trials were rated as 100% confident). A 
further participant attended only the first behavioural session. Twenty-two 
participants were included in the analysis of fMRI data (12 females, mean age 24.1, 
SD = 3.4). The study was approved by NYU’s University Committee on Activities 
Involving Human Subjects, all relevant ethical regulations were followed, and 
participants provided written consent before the experiment. 
 
Stimuli 
The experiment was programmed in Matlab 2014b (MathWorks) using Psychtoolbox 
(version 3.0.12; 47,48). In the behavioural session stimuli were presented on an iMac 
desktop monitor viewed at a distance of approximately 45cm. In the scanner, stimuli 
were presented via a projector at an approximate viewing distance of 58cm. Stimuli 
consisted of random-dot kinematograms (RDKs). Each RDK consisted of a field of 
random dots (0.12° diameter) contained in a 7° circular white aperture. Each set of 
dots lasted for 1 video frame and was replotted 3 frames later49. Each time the same 
set of dots was replotted, a subset determined by the percent coherence was offset 
from their original location in the direction of motion and the remaining dots were 
replotted randomly. Motion direction was either to the left or right along the 
horizontal meridian. Coherently moving dots moved at a speed of 5°/s and the number 
of dots in each frame was specified to create a density of 30 dots/deg2/s. Each RDK 
lasted for 300ms. 
 
Task and procedure 
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Participants attended the laboratory on two different days. On the first day they 
completed a calibration session to obtain their psychometric function for motion 
discrimination, followed by 900 trials of the main experiment shown in Figure 1A. On 
the second day participants completed the fMRI scan. Data collection and analysis 
were not performed blind to the conditions of the experiments. 
 
Behavioural session 
Calibration phase: Before performing the main task each participant performed 240 
trials of motion direction estimation without confidence ratings or additional post-
decision motion. These trials were equally distributed across 6 coherence levels: 3%, 
8%, 12%, 24%, 48% and 100%. Motion direction (left or right) was randomized and 
independent of coherence. Judgments were made using the left or right arrow keys on 
a standard computer keyboard after the offset of each stimulus, and the response was 
unspeeded. During the calibration phase (but not the experiment phase), auditory 
feedback was delivered to indicate whether the judgment was correct (high pitched 
tone) or incorrect (low pitched tone). The intertrial interval was 1s. The three 
coherence levels that resulted in 60%, 75% and 90% correct choices were individually 
determined for each subject using probit regression. These coherence levels were then 
stored for use in the experiment phase. 
 
Experiment phase: In the main experiment subjects completed 900 trials of the task 
shown in Figure 1A. Each trial consisted of the following events in sequence. A 
central fixation point (0.2° diameter) and empty aperture were presented, followed by 
an RDK of low, medium or high coherence. Following the offset of the RDK 
participants were asked to make a judgment as to whether the movement of the dots 
was to the left or the right. Their response triggered a second post-decision RDK that 
was shown after a delay of 100ms. The second post-decision RDK was always in the 
same (correct) direction as the first pre-decision RDK, but of a variable coherence. 
Subjects were instructed that this was “bonus” motion that they could use to inform 
their confidence in their initial response. They were told that the bonus motion was 
always in the same direction as the regular motion, but were not informed that it may 
vary in strength. A fully factorial design crossed 3 pre-decision coherence levels with 
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3 post-decision coherence levels yielding 9 experimental conditions each with 100 
trials. Trial order was fully randomized for each subject.   
 
After the bonus motion was displayed, an empty aperture was presented for 200ms 
and then participants were asked to indicate their confidence in their initial judgment 
on a horizontal scale (length = 14°) ranging from 0-100%. Confidence responses were 
made with a mouse click controlled by the right hand and could be made anywhere 
along the scale. Half of subjects saw the scale labeled with 0% on the left and 100% 
on the right and half saw the reverse orientation, with scale orientation fixed across 
both the behavioural and fMRI sessions. A vertical red cursor provided feedback as to 
the selected rating. In the behavioural session there was no time limit for either the 
response or the confidence rating, and no feedback was given as to whether the 
response was correct or incorrect. 
 
fMRI session 
During the structural scan at the start of the fMRI experiment, participants carried out 
a “top-up” calibration session consisting of 120 trials of left/right motion judgments 
without confidence ratings. Three randomly interleaved QUEST adaptive staircases 
were used to estimate coherence levels associated with 60%, 75% and 90% correct 
performance. The prior for each staircase was centered on the corresponding 
coherence estimate derived from the behavioural calibration session. 
 
Prior to entering the scanner, participants were re-familiarized with the task and 
confidence rating scale. The task was identical to that described above except for the 
following changes. Response deadlines of 1.5s and 3s were imposed for the initial 
decision and confidence rating, respectively. Both motion judgments and confidence 
ratings were made via an fMRI button box held in the right hand. To rate confidence, 
participants used their index and middle fingers to move a cursor in steps of 10% to 
the left or right of the scale. The initial cursor location on each trial was randomized. 
The rating was confirmed by pressing a third button with the ring finger, after which 
the cursor changed from white to red for 500ms. During each of the 4 scanner runs 
participants completed 90 trials. 
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After the main experiment we carried out a localizer scan for motion-related activity. 
During this scan participants passively viewed 20 alternating displays of moving and 
stationary dots, each lasting 12s. Equal numbers of leftward and rightward moving dot 
displays were included at a constant coherence of 50%. 
 
Scoring rule for confidence ratings 
Confidence ratings were incentivized using the quadratic scoring rule (QSR)50: 
 points = 100 ∗ [1 − (𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡E − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓E)#] 
 
where correcti is equal to 1 on trial i if the choice was correct and 0 otherwise, and 
confi is the subject’s confidence rating on trial i entered as a probability between 0 and 
1. The QSR is a proper scoring rule in that maximum earnings are obtained by jointly 
maximizing the accuracy of choices and confidence ratings51. For every 5,000 points 
subjects received an extra $1. This scoring rule ensures that confidence is orthogonal 
to the reward the subject expects to receive for each trial. Maximal reward is obtained 
both when one is maximally confident and right, and minimally confident and wrong 
(Figure 1C). 
 
The confidence scale was labeled both with scale steps of 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% 
and 100% (positioned above the line) and, following Boldt and Yeung34, verbal 
confidence labels of “certainly wrong”, “probably wrong”, “maybe wrong”, “maybe 
correct”, “probably correct” and “certainly correct” (positioned below the line). The 
scale midpoint was marked with a vertical tick halfway between the 40% and 60% 
labels. Prior to taking part in the main experiment participants underwent a training 
session to instruct them in the use of the confidence scale. Following Moore and 
Healy52, participants were first instructed: 
 
“You can win points by matching your confidence to your performance. Specifically, 
the number of points you earn is based on a rule that calculates how closely your 
confidence tracks your performance: 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 = 100 ∗ [1 − (𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 −𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)#]. This formula may appear complicated, but what it means for you is 
very simple: You will get paid the most if you honestly report your best guess about 
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the likelihood of being correct. You can earn between 0 and 100 points for each 
trial.” 
 
Participants were then asked where they should click on the scale if they were sure 
they responded either correctly or incorrectly. They were then informed: 
 
“The correct answers were: If you are sure you responded correctly, you should 
respond 100% confidence/certainly correct. If you are sure you picked the wrong 
direction, you should respond 0% confidence/certainly wrong. If you are not 100% 
sure about being correct or incorrect you should select a location in between 
according to the following descriptions on the confidence scale: probably incorrect = 
20% confidence; maybe incorrect = 40% confidence; maybe correct = 60% 
confidence; probably correct = 80% confidence. You can also click anywhere in 
between these percentages.” 
 
Statistics 
Effects of condition on confidence ratings and accuracy were assessed using 
hierarchical mixed-effects regression using the lme4 package in R (Version 3.3.3; 53). 
For confidence ratings we constructed linear models separately for correct and 
incorrect trials. Pre- and post-decision coherence values and their interaction were 
entered as separate predictors of confidence. Log response times were also included in 
the model. We obtained P-values for regression coefficients using the car package for 
R54. Mixed-effects logistic regression was used to quantify the effect of condition on 
response accuracy. In all regressions we modeled subject-level slopes and intercepts, 
and report coefficients and statistics at the population level. The distribution of 





We developed a Bayesian model of choice and confidence that is grounded in signal 
detection theory. Subjects receive two internal samples, 𝑋.+, generated from pre-
decision motion and 𝑋.*/- from post-decision motion. Motion direction 𝑑 ∈ [−1	1] 
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determines the sample means with Gaussian signal-to-noise depending linearly on 
coherence 𝜃.+,  or 𝜃.*/- via sensitivity parameter 𝑘 (where ~ indicates “is distributed 
as”): 
 𝑋.+,~	𝑁V𝑑𝑘𝜃.+,, 1X 𝑋.*/-~	𝑁(𝑑𝑘𝜃.*/-, 1) 
  
We assume that subjects do not know the coherence levels on a particular trial (𝜃.+,  
and 𝜃.*/-) which are nuisance parameters that do not carry any information about the 
correct choice. We therefore approximate the likelihood of 𝑋.+, and 𝑋.*/- as a 
Gaussian with mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎# determined by a mixture of Gaussians across 
each of the three possible coherence levels. Starting with 𝑋.+,: 
 𝑃V𝑋.+,\𝑑 = 1X = ] 𝑝V𝜃.+,X	𝑁(𝑘𝜃.+,, 1)^_`a  
 
As each of the three coherence levels are equally likely by design (𝑝V𝜃.+,X = 0.33) 
we can define the mean as: 
 𝜇 = ∑𝑘𝜃.+,3  
The aggregate variance 𝜎# can be decomposed into both between- and within-
condition variance. From the law of total variance: 
 𝜎# = ] 𝑝V𝜃.+,X	e𝐸e𝑋.+,\𝑘𝜃.+,g − 𝜇g#^_`a +	] 𝑝(𝜃.+,)^_`a 	Var(𝑋.+,|𝑘𝜃.+,) 𝜎# = ] 𝑝V𝜃.+,Xe𝑘𝜃.+, − 𝜇g#^_`a 	+ 1 
Because the possible values of 𝜃 are the same pre- and post-decision, 𝜇 and 𝜎# are the 
same for both 𝑋.+, and 𝑋.*/-. Actions a are made by comparing 𝑋.+, to a criterion 
parameter m that accommodates any stimulus-independent biases towards the 
leftward or rightward response, 𝑎 = sign(𝑋.+, − 𝑚). 
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Each sample, 𝑋.+, and 𝑋.*/-, updates the log posterior odds of motion direction 
(rightward or leftward), 𝐿𝑂oE+, which under flat priors is equal to the log-likelihood: 
 𝐿𝑂oE+.+, = log 𝑃(𝑑 = 1|𝑋.+,)𝑃(𝑑 = −1|𝑋.+,) = log 𝑃(𝑋.+,|𝑑 = 1)𝑃(𝑋.+,|𝑑 = −1) 𝐿𝑂oE+.*/- = log 𝑃(𝑑 = 1|𝑋.*/-)𝑃(𝑑 = −1|𝑋.*/-) = log 𝑃(𝑋.*/-|𝑑 = 1)𝑃(𝑋.*/-|𝑑 = −1) 
 
where, due to the Gaussian generative model for 𝑋, 𝐿𝑂oE+ is equal to: 𝐿𝑂oE+ = log 𝑒(qrs)t #ut⁄𝑒(qws)t #ut⁄  𝐿𝑂oE+ = 2𝜇𝑋𝜎#  
 
The total accumulated evidence for rightward vs. leftward motion at the end of the 
trial is: 
 𝐿𝑂oE+-*-yz = 𝐿𝑂oE+.+, + 𝐿𝑂oE+.*/- 
 
Positive values indicate greater belief in rightward motion; negative values greater 
belief in leftward motion. 
 
To update confidence in one’s choice, the belief in motion direction (𝐿𝑂oE+) is 
transformed into a belief about decision accuracy (𝐿𝑂)*++,)-) conditional on the 
chosen action: 
 
If 𝑎 = 1: 𝐿𝑂)*++,)- = 𝐿𝑂oE+  
Otherwise: 𝐿𝑂)*++,)- = −𝐿𝑂oE+ 
 
As for 𝐿𝑂oE+ , 𝐿𝑂)*++,)- can be decomposed into pre- and post-decisional components: 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz = 𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.+, + 𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.*/-  
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The final log odds correct is then transformed to a probability to generate a 
confidence rating on a 0-1 scale: 
 Confidence = 	 11 + exp	(−𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz ) 
 
Extensions of Bayesian model 
Temporal weighting 
We considered that subjects may apply differential weights to pre- and post-decision 
motion when computing confidence6,7. To capture this possibility, we introduced free 
parameters wpre and wpost that controlled the relative weights applied to pre- and post-
decision evidence: 
 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz = 𝑤.+,𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.+, + 𝑤.*/-𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.*/-  
 
Choice weighting 
We considered that subjects might pay selective attention to post-decision evidence 
dependent on whether it is consistent/inconsistent with their initial choice (a form of 
commitment bias; this is similar to the “selective reduced-gain” model of Bronfman et 
al.6). To capture such effects, we introduced two weighting parameters wcon and wincon 
that differentially weight confirmatory and disconfirmatory post-decision evidence:  
 
If signV𝐿𝑂oE+.*/-X = sign(𝑎): 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz = 𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.+, + 𝑤)*𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.*/-  
 
Otherwise: 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz = 𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.+, + 𝑤E)*𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.*/-  
 
Choice bias 
A second variant of commitment bias operates to boost confidence in the chosen 
response without altering sensitivity to post-decision evidence (the choice acts as a 
prior on subsequent confidence formation25; this is similar to Bronfman et al.’s 
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“value-shift” model6). To capture such effects, we introduced a parameter b that 
modulated final confidence dependent on the choice: 
 𝐿𝑂oE+Ey/ = sign(𝑎) ∗ log  𝑏1 − 𝑏 
 𝐿𝑂oE+-*-yz = 𝐿𝑂oE+.+, + 𝐿𝑂oE+.*/- + 𝐿𝑂oE+Ey/  
If 𝑎 = 1: 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz = 𝐿𝑂oE+-*-yz  
Otherwise: 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz = −𝐿𝑂oE+-*-yz 
 
Nonlinear confidence mapping 
The ideal observer model assumes that subjects faithfully report probability correct, 
which maximizes the quadratic scoring rule (QSR). We also considered that subjects 
misperceive the scoring rule (or, equivalently, apply a nonlinear mapping between 
probability correct and reported confidence), with consequences for how particular 
confidence ratings were selected. For instance, subjects may overweight the extremes 
of the scale due to perceiving these extremes as returning greater reward. 
 
Such misperceptions can be captured by allowing a flexible mapping between the 
model’s confidence and reported confidence. We implemented a one-parameter 
scaling of log-odds22 which is able to capture both under- and overweighting of 
extreme confidence ratings: 𝐿𝑂(𝜋(𝑐)) = 𝛾. log  𝑐1 − 𝑐 Confidence = 	 11 + exp	(−𝐿𝑂(𝜋(𝑐))) 
 
where c denotes the interim output of the model’s estimate of probability correct. 
 
When 𝛾 = 1, 𝜋(𝑐) = 𝑐, and there is no distortion. When 𝛾 > 1, the curve relating 
model confidence to reported confidence is S-shaped, whereas when 0 < 𝛾 < 1, an 
inverted-S-shaped curve is obtained. 
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Informing confidence with decision time 
Finally we considered that in all models subjects may use decision time from the 
initial decision as a cue to confidence23. To capture this possibility we modulated the 
final 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz  of both the Bayesian and extended models by response time via a free 
parameter 𝛽%&: 
 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz ← 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz + 𝛽%& log(𝑅𝑇) 
 
In the case of the mapping model the modulation by decision time was applied prior 
to passing 𝐿𝑂)*++,)--*-yz  through the nonlinear mapping function. 
 
This set of model extensions led to a factorial combination of 5 model variants (ideal 
Bayesian, temporal weighting, choice weighting, choice bias, mapping) × 2 (non-
response time dependent, response time dependent) = 10 models which were fitted to 
each subject/dataset as described below. 
 
Model fitting 
We used Markov chain Monte Carlo methods implemented in STAN55 to sample from 
posterior distributions of parameters given motion directions d, motion coherences 𝜃.+,  and 𝜃.*/-, subjects’ choices a and confidence ratings r.  
 
Pseudo-code for the Bayesian model is given below (following STAN convention, 
scale parameters are written as standard deviations): 
 
Priors: 𝑚	~	𝑁(0, 10)	 𝑘	~	𝑁(0,10) 
Model: 𝑋.+,~	𝑁V𝑑𝑘𝜃.+,, 1X 𝑋.*/-~	𝑁V𝑑𝑘𝜃.*/-, 1X 𝑎	~	Bernoulli_logit(100 ∗ (𝑋.+, − 𝑚)) 𝑟	~	𝑁(conf, 0.025) 
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“conf” is the output of the confidence computation detailed above. The logit function 
implements a steep softmax relating 𝑋.+, to a and is applied for computational 
stability. The mapping between model confidence and observed confidence allowed a 
small degree of imprecision (𝜎 = 0.025) in subjects’ ratings, roughly equivalent to 
grouping continuous ratings made on a 0-1 scale into ten bins.  
 
We placed weakly informative priors over coefficients in the extended models for 
computational stability. In the weighted models, w parameters were drawn from 𝑁(1, 1)	distributions bounded below by 0 and above by 5. In the bias model, b was 
drawn from a uniform [0 1] distribution. In the nonlinear mapping model, 𝛾 was 
drawn from a positively constrained 𝑁(1, 1) distribution. In the RT models, 𝛽%& was 
drawn from a 𝑁(0, 10) distribution. 
 
We fitted each model with 12,000 samples divided across 3 chains separately for each 
subject’s fMRI and behavioural datasets. 1000 samples per chain were discarded for 
burn-in, resulting in 9,000 stored samples. Chains were visually checked for 
convergence and Gelman and Rubin’s potential scale reduction factor 𝑅 was 
calculated for all parameters. For the majority (469 out of 470) of models/subjects, 𝑅 
values were all < 1.1, indicating good convergence. The fit of the choice 
weighted+RT model to the behavioural session data failed to converge for one 




To compare models we assessed the ability of a model fit to behavioural data to 
capture the data of the same subject in the fMRI session, and vice-versa. For each 
subject and model we drew 1000 samples from posterior distributions of fitted 
parameters and generated synthetic choice and confidence data. The trialwise log-
likelihood (itself a sum of choice and confidence rating log-likelihoods) was summed 
across trials and stored for each parameter draw, and then averaged across draws to 
return a subject- and model-specific cross-validated log-likelihood. Fitted parameter 
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values from the best-fitting Bayesian+RT model for behavioural and fMRI sessions 




To visualize qualitative features of the Bayesian model (Figure 1B) we simulated 
10,000 trials from each condition of the factorial design with k=4 and m=0. Pre- and 
post-decision motion coherences were crossed in a fully factorial design and drawn 
from the set 0%, 25% or 50%. True motion direction d was selected randomly on each 
trial.  
 
To determine the ability of the best-fitting Bayesian+RT model to account for 
subjects’ choices and confidence ratings (a posterior predictive check), we drew 1000 
samples from posterior distributions of fitted parameters and for each draw simulated 
one trial sequence with these parameter settings and averaged over simulations. To 
obtain regressors for fMRI and mediation analyses we also stored values of pre-
decision evidence (𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.+, ) and post-decision evidence (𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.*/- ) averaged over 
5000 trials per condition (3 pre-decision coherence levels × 3 post-decision coherence 
levels × 2 choice accuracies). 
 
fMRI acquisition and preprocessing 
Whole-brain fMRI images were acquired using a 3T Allegra scanner (Siemens) with 
an NM011 Head transmit coil (Nova Medical, Wakefield, MA) at New York 
University’s Center for Brain Imaging. BOLD-sensitive echo-planar images (EPI) 
were acquired using a Siemens epi2d BOLD sequence (42 transverse slices, TR = 
2.34s; echo time = 30ms; 3 x 3 x 3 mm resolution voxels; flip angle = 90 degrees; 64 
x 64 matrix; slice tilt -30deg T > C; interleaved acquisition). The main experiment 
consisted of 4 runs of 315 volumes, and the localizer scan consisted of a single run of 
211 volumes. A high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan (MPRAGE, 1x1x1 mm 
voxels, 176 slices) and local field maps were also acquired. 
 
All preprocessing was carried out using SPM12 v6225 (Statistical Parametric 
Mapping; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first 5 volumes of each run were discarded 
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to allow for T1 equilibration. Functional images were slice-time corrected, realigned 
and unwarped using the collected field maps56. Structural T1-weighted images were 
coregistered to the mean functional image of each subject using the iterative mutual 
information-based algorithm. Each participant’s structural image was segmented into 
gray matter, white matter and cerebral spinal fluid images using a nonlinear 
deformation field to map it onto a template tissue probability map57. These 
deformations were applied to both structural and functional images to create new 
images spatially normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute space and interpolated 
to 2x2x2 mm voxels. Normalized images were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian 
kernel with full-width half-maximum of 6mm. 
 
fMRI analysis 
We employed a combination of region-of-interest (ROI) analyses on trial-by-trial 
activity estimates, multilevel mediation models and standard whole-brain general 
linear model (GLM) approaches. 
 
Whole-brain univariate analysis 
We used SPM12 for first-level analyses. In all GLMs, regressors were convolved with 
a canonical hemodynamic response function. Motion correction parameters estimated 
from the realignment procedure and their first temporal derivatives were entered as 
nuisance covariates, and low-frequency drifts were removed using a high-pass filter 
(128 s cutoff). 
 
GLM1 
GLM1 was constructed to examine activity associated with changes in post-decision 
motion strength. Correct and incorrect trials were modeled as separate stick functions 
timelocked to the onset of the post-decision motion plus parametric modulations by 
post-decision motion strength (low= -1, medium = 0, high = 1). Additional regressors 
were also included at the onset of pre-decision motion (parametrically modulated by 
pre-decision motion strength and log response times) and confidence rating period. 
 
GLM2 
GLM2 was constructed to examine activity associated with changes in reported 
confidence. A stick function timelocked to confidence rating onset was parametrically 
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modulated by reported confidence. Regressors were also included at the onset of pre-




A priori regions of interest were specified as follows. The pMFC ROI was an 8mm 
sphere around peak coordinates (MNI coordinates [x, y, z] = [0 17 46]) obtained from 
our previous study of decision confidence12. Anterior prefrontal ROIs were obtained 
from the right-hemisphere atlas developed by Neubert et al.24 (area 46, FPl and FPm) 
and mirrored to the left hemisphere to create bilateral masks. The vmPFC ROI was an 
8mm sphere around peak coordinates [-1 46 -7] obtained from a meta-analysis of 
value-related activity58. The ventral striatum ROI was specified anatomically from the 
Oxford-Imanova Striatal Structural atlas included with FSL (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk). 
Within each ROI we averaged single-trial beta estimates over voxels, scaled the 
timeseries to have zero mean and unit SD, and computed the mean activity per 
condition. 
 
Quantification of single-trial response magnitudes 
To facilitate both ROI and mediation analyses we estimated single-trial BOLD 
responses as a beta timeseries. This was achieved by specifying a GLM design matrix 
with separate regressors (stick functions) for each trial, each aligned to either the 
onset of the post-decision motion stimulus (for PDE analyses in Figure 3) or the 
confidence rating period (for mediation models and regressions on confidence; 
Figures 4 and 5). Each regressor was convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). Motion correction parameters estimated from the 
realignment procedure and their first temporal derivatives were entered as nuisance 
covariates, and low-frequency drifts were removed using a high-pass filter (128 s 
cutoff). One important consideration in using single-trial estimates is that the beta for 
a given trial can be strongly affected by acquisition artifacts that co-occur with that 
trial (e.g. motion or scanner pulse artifacts). For each subject we therefore computed 
the grand mean beta estimate across both voxels and trials, and excluded any trial 
whose mean beta estimate across voxels exceeded 3 SDs from this grand mean38. An 
average of 3.6 trials per subject (1.0%; maximum = 9 trials) were excluded. 
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To visualize the relationship between activity and task variables over time we also 
extracted the pre-processed BOLD data per TR. Low-frequency drifts (estimated 
using a cosine basis set, 128 s cutoff) and motion parameters plus their first temporal 
derivatives were regressed out of the signal, and the residual activity was oversampled 
at 10 Hz. Timecourses were extracted from 12 second windows timelocked to the 
onset of pre-decision motion. To construct Figure 4C we applied a GLM (see below) 
to each timepoint resulting in a timecourse of beta weights for each regressor. 
Nonparametric permutation tests were used to assess significant group-level 
significance of beta weights. For each permutation, we randomised the assignment 
between BOLD timeseries and trial labels and recalculated the group-level T-statistic 
comparing beta weights against zero (10,000 permutations). Individual timepoints 
were labeled as significant if the true T-statistic fell outside the 2.5 or 97.5 percentiles 
of the null distribution.  
 
ROI GLMs 
As in our regression analyses of behavior, we modeled subject-level slopes and 
intercepts, and report coefficients and statistics at the population level. To test for an 
interaction between response accuracy and post-decision evidence, we fitted the 
following model to each ROI beta series: 
 
BOLD ~ accuracy + pre_decision_coherence + post_decision_coherence + 
accuracy*pre_decision_coherence + accuracy*post_decision_coherence + log(RT) 
 
Accuracy was specified as error=-1, correct=1; pre- and post-decision coherence were 
specified as low=-1, medium=0, high=1.  
 
To estimate relationships between ROI activity and pre- and post-decision evidence 
from the fitted computational model (i.e. log-odds correct) we fitted the following 
model: 
 
BOLD ~  𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.+, + 𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.*/- + log	(𝑅𝑇) 
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To assess relationships between confidence and activity on both change and no-
change of mind trials, we conducted a segmented regression analysis. This method 
partitions the independent variable into discrete intervals, and a separate slope is fit to 
each interval. Here, we separated the effect of confidence on change (confidence <= 
0.5) and no-change (confidence > 0.5) trials, and fit the following model: 
 
BOLD ~ change_confidence + no_change_confidence + log(RT) 
 
Multilevel mediation analysis 
We performed multilevel mediation analysis of a standard three-variable model20 
using the Mediation Toolbox (http://wagerlab.colorado.edu/tools). Mediation analysis 
assesses whether covariance between two variables (X and Y) is explained by a third 
variable (the mediator, M). Significant mediation is obtained when inclusion of M in a 
path model of the effects of X on Y significantly alters the slope of the X-Y 
relationship. When applied to fMRI data, mediation analysis thus extends the standard 
univariate model by incorporating an additional outcome variable (in this case, 
confidence reports) and jointly testing three effects of interest: the impact of X (post-
decision evidence, 𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.*/- ) on brain activity (path a); the impact of brain activity on 
Y (confidence reports), controlling for X (path b); and formal mediation of X on Y by 
brain activity M. In all models we included log reaction times and pre-decision 
evidence (𝐿𝑂)*++,)-.+, ) as covariates of no interest. 
 
The Mediation Toolbox permits a multi-level implementation of the standard 
mediation model, treating participant as a random effect59. Significance estimates for 
paths a, b and 𝑎 × 𝑏 are computed through bootstrapping. We estimated distributions 
of subject-level path coefficients by drawing 10,000 random samples with 
replacement. Two-tailed p-values were calculated at each voxel/ROI from the 
bootstrap confidence interval60. 
 
Whole-brain statistical inference 
Single-subject contrast images were entered into a second-level random effects 
analysis using one-sample t-tests against zero to assess group-level significance. To 
correct for multiple comparisons we used Gaussian random field theory as 
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implemented in SPM12 to obtain clusters satisfying P<0.05, family-wise error (FWE) 
corrected at a cluster-defining threshold of P<0.001. Numerical simulations and tests 
of empirical data collected under the null hypothesis show that this combination of 
cluster-defining threshold and RFT produces appropriate control of false positives61,62.  
 
To apply multiple comparisons correction to the multilevel mediation model output 
we took a non-parametric approach due to second-level images already comprising 
bootstrapped P-values. The cluster extent threshold for FWE correction was estimated 
based on Monte Carlo simulation (100,000 iterations) using the 3dClustSim routine in 
AFNI (version compiled September 2015; http://afni.nimh.nih.gov) and SPM 12’s 
estimate of the intrinsic smoothness of the residuals. Again this method in conjunction 
with a cluster-defining threshold of P < 0.001 provides appropriate control over false 
positives61,62. Statistical maps were visualized using FSLview 
(https://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki) and Surf Ice 
(https://www.nitrc.org/projects/surfice/). 
 
Life Sciences Reporting Summary 




Anonymised behavioural data are available on GitHub 
(https://github.com/metacoglab/FlemingVdPuttenDaw). Unthresholded group-level 
statistical maps are available on NeuroVault (DOI 
https://neurovault.org/collections/VEJNEJRA/). Other data that support the findings 
of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 
 
Code availability 
MATLAB, STAN and R code for reproducing all analyses and computational model 
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